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Employment Discrimination
by Peter Reed Corbin*
and John E. Duvall*
The field of Employment Discrimination continued to be alive and well
during the 2016 survey period.' Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit continued its recent trend of issuing the
vast majority of its employment discrimination cases as unpublished
opinions (often per curiam opinions affirming a summary judgment for
the employer), the court of appeals rendered far more published opinions
during the survey period than has recently been its practice. The Eleventh Circuit issued six published Title VII opinions, and fifteen published
employment discrimination opinions overall. For instance, in Villarreal
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 2 the Eleventh Circuit, en banc, held that
job applicants cannot sue an employer for disparate impact discrimina3
tion under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In Peppers v.
4
Cobb County, the court of appeals rendered a significant opinion on the

*Of counsel to the law firm of FordHarrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. University of
Virginia (B.A., 1970); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
1975). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
**Of counsel to the law firm of FordHarrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. Florida State
University (B.S., 1973); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1985). Member, State Bar of Florida.
This Article covers significant cases in the area of employment discrimination law decided by the Supreme Court of the United States and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit during 2016. Cases arising under the following federal statutes
are included: Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(2012); the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (2012); Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012); and
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
1. For analysis of Eleventh Circuit employment discrimination law during the prior
survey period, see Peter Reed Corbin & John E. Duvall, Employment Discrimination,Eleventh Circuit Survey, 67 MERCER L. REV. 875 (2016).
2. 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016).
3. Id. at 973.
4. 835 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2016).
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concept of joint employers for purposes of Title VII and the various employment discrimination statutes. 5 Finally, in Quigg v. Thomas County
School District,6 the Eleventh Circuit rejected the utilization of the familiar McDonnell Douglas model of proof at the summary judgment stage in
Title VII mixed motive actions.7
The Supreme Court of the United States also made its contribution
during the survey period. In Green v. Brennan,8 the Court decided when
the statute of limitations begins to run in the context of a constructive
discharge claim.9 In CRST Vann Expedited, Inc. v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission,1o the high court, in the midst of affirming a $4
million attorney fee award to the defendant employer, decided that a defendant does not need to obtain a favorable ruling on the merits in order
to become a "prevailing party" under Title VII.11
I. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

A. Coverage under the Act
1. Joint Employers.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196412 prohibits certain forms of
discrimination against employees by employers. In Peppers v. Cobb
County,1 3 the issue was whether the defendant could be drawn within the
scope of the Act's coverage through application of the joint employer
theory. The plaintiff was a retired criminal investigator with the Cobb
Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office. After he learned that a less
experienced female in the office was earning a substantially higher
salary (approximately $15,000 more a year) than he was making for
performing the same job, the plaintiff brought a lawsuit under both Title
VII (alleging gender discrimination) and the Equal Pay Act. 14 However,
the defendant that the plaintiff chose to sue was not the Cobb County
District Attorney's Office; rather, he brought suit against Cobb County.
Finding that the county and the district attorney's office were not joint

5. See id.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

814 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1232-33.
136 S. Ct. 1769 (2016).
Id. at 1774.
136 S. Ct. 1642 (2016).
Id. at 1651.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
835 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2016).
29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012 & Supp. II 2015).
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employers, the district court granted summary judgment for the
defendant.15

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit closely examined the nature of the
relationship between the district attorney's office and the county. The
court noted that under the Georgia constitution, the district attorney's
office was a separate legal entity, and that the county was responsible
16
only for approving the district attorney's annual budget. Applying past
precedent, the court of appeals reasoned that the joint employer issue
turned on (1) the degree of control that the alleged joint employer had
over the employee; and (2) whether the alleged joint employer "had the
power to hire, fire, or modify the terms and conditions of the employee's
employment."17 The Eleventh Circuit went on to conclude:
The long and short of it is that the District Attorney alone filled nearly
all the roles traditionally filled by an employer. Indeed, Cobb County
had no more control over the nature, power, and functions of the investigators than it had the authority to determine which cases and
18
prosecutions the District Attorney's Office ought to pursue.

Agreeing with the district court that a joint employer relationship had not been established, the court of appeals af-

firmed.19
2. Sovereign Immunity.
20
In Longo v. Seminole Indian Casino-Immokalee, the Eleventh Circuit
decided that a casino operated by the Seminole Tribe of Florida was im21
An employee had filed a lawsuit
mune from suit under Title VII.
against the casino alleging gender discrimination and retaliation under
Title VII. The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss
on the ground that the tribe was a federally recognized tribe entitled to
sovereign immunity. 22 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
whether a tribe was "federally acknowledged" was determined by
whether it was included on a list published by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 23 Since the Seminole Tribe was included on the Bureau's list, the
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Peppers, 835 F.3d at 1294.
Id.
Id. at 1297.
Id. at 1300.
Id. at 1301.
813 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1349.
Id.
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Eleventh Circuit held that it was bound by the Bureau's determination,
and affirmed the district court's dismissal on grounds of sovereign immunity. 24
B. Disparate Treatment-Burdenof Proof
1. Mixed Motive.
In Quigg v. Thomas County School District,25 a case of first impression,
the Eleventh Circuit determined the appropriate burden of proof in a
mixed motive case relying on circumstantial evidence (as opposed to direct evidence of discrimination). 26 The plaintiff was employed as the superintendent of the Thomas County School District. After several years
of a tumultuous relationship with several school board members, the
school board voted five to two against renewing the plaintiffs contract.
There was evidence that, following the vote, one of the school board members had remarked that the plaintiff "needed a strong male to work under
her to handle problems, someone who could get tough." 27 The plaintiff

then filed a gender discrimination and retaliation lawsuit pursuant to
both Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 186628 and Title VII. The
district court granted summary judgment for the school board. 29
On appeal, the primary issue before the Eleventh Circuit was the
proper burden of proof in the plaintiffs mixed motive gender discrimination claim. The court of appeals found that, at least at the summary
judgment stage, the proper framework was not the traditional McDonnell
Douglastest adopted by the Supreme Court,30 but rather, the test annunciated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.31 Under that test, in order to defeat
summary judgment in a mixed motive claim, the plaintiff need only present evidence sufficient to show that (1) the defendant took an adverse
employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) [a protected characteristic] "was a motivating factor" for the defendant's adverse employment
action. 32 In applying the test, the Eleventh Circuit found that there was

24.
25.
26.
27.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 1350.
814 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1232-33.
Id. at 1234.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1234-35.
Id. at 1232, 1238.
533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 402 (emphasis added).
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a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff had been discriminated against on account of her gender, and remanded the case for
consideration of this issue, as well as the defendant's "same decision" defense (namely, whether the defendant would have taken the same action
33
notwithstanding its partial discriminatory motive).
2. Failure to Hire.
34
In EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, the issue was
whether the defendant discriminated against an African-American job
applicant when it failed to hire her pursuant to its race-neutral grooming
policy when she refused to cut her dreadlocks. The defendant was a
claims processing company in Mobile, Alabama that provided customer
service support to insurance companies. The applicant applied for a customer service representative position, and came to her job interview
"dressed in a blue business suit and wearing her hair in short dreadlocks." 35 The defendant initially offered the applicant a job, but then rescinded the job offer when she would not comply with the defendant's
race-neutral grooming policy by cutting her hair. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought suit on the applicant's
behalf, alleging race discrimination pursuant to Title VII. The district
court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule
36
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit clarified that the EEOC was bringing
only a disparate treatment claim, and not a disparate impact claim alleging that the race-neutral grooming policy had a discriminatory impact on
African-Americans. 37 The EEOC's theory was that the defendant's application of its grooming policy constituted racial discrimination on its face
"because dreadlocks are a manner of wearing the hair that is physiologi38
In recally and culturally associated with people of African descent."
follows:
as
concluded
Circuit
Eleventh
the
argument,
this
jecting
Critically, the EEOC's proposed amended complaint did not allege that
dreadlocks themselves are an immutable characteristic of black persons, and in fact stated that black persons choose to wear dreadlocks
because that hairstyle is historically, physiologically, and culturally
associated with their race. That dreadlocks are a "natural outgrowth"

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Quigg, 814 F.3d at

1243-44.
837 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1159.
Id. at 1158; FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
CatastropheMgmt. Sols., 837 F.3d at 1161.
Id.
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of the texture of black hair does not make them an immutable characteristic of race. 39
Noting that the EEOC's position ran "headlong into a wall of contrary
caselaw," 40 the court of appeals noted that it was tasked with simply interpreting the law, and not "with grading competing doctoral theses in
anthropology or sociology." 41 After noting the court's respect for the
plaintiffs "[intensively] personal decision and all [that] it entails," 4 2 the
court of appeals affirmed the district court. 43
In Calvert v. Doe," an interesting unpublished decision, the plaintiff
lost his primary argument on appeal, but still managed to gain a reversal
of the employer's summary judgment ruling below. 45 The plaintiff had
previously filed a Title VII race discrimination claim against Fulton
County, Georgia, which had settled the claim in 2004. Since that time,
the plaintiff had applied for positions twenty-six different times, but had
received only one job interview for a juvenile clerk position. Following
that interview, the plaintiff was not hired, although four candidates who
ranked below him received job offers. The plaintiff then filed a retaliation
claim against the county pursuant to Title VII. The district court granted
summary judgment for the county.4 6 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that
the district court erred when it excluded from evidence a statement by
the juvenile court's human resources coordinator that the plaintiff had
not been hired because "'somebody up the street' did not want to hire [the
plaintiff] because of the lawsuit." 47 "The district court excluded [this
statement] as inadmissible hearsay.""8 On appeal, relying on its prior
decision in Kidd v. Mando American Corp., 49 the Eleventh Circuit agreed
that the human resources coordinator's statement was not admissible
under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) of the Federal Rules of Evidence5 0 because she
was a non-decision maker and her duties did not rise above a ministerial
role in the decision-making process.51 Nonetheless, the court of appeals

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 1168
Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1172.
Id.
648 F. App'x 925 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 926.
Id.
Id. at 927.
Id.
731 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 2013).
FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(D).
Kidd, 731 F.3d at 1207-08.
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found that the plaintiff had established "a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence" 52 sufficient to create a material issue of disputed fact,
53
and vacated the lower court's award of summary judgment.
3. Gender Discrimination.
In Chavez v. Credit National Auto Sales, LLC,54 the plaintiff, an auto
mechanic, filed a gender discrimination lawsuit under Title VII alleging
that she was terminated because she was a transgender person. The defendant asserted that it fired the plaintiff because she was sleeping while
on the clock. It was not in dispute that the plaintiff had been caught after
having slept for forty minutes in a customer's vehicle while on the clock.
55
On
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant.
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that, under the traditional McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the plaintiff failed to create a
jury issue as to pretext, since the plaintiff admitted to the sleeping conduct, and since the employer had also fired another employee for sleeping
on the job.56 However, the court of appeals also analyzed evidence that
57
the plaintiff was subjected to a "heightened scrutiny" after announcing
her gender transition plans, and that the defendant bypassed its progressive disciplinary process when it terminated the plaintiff for sleeping on
the job.58 In the end, the court of appeals ruled that the plaintiff had
presented enough evidence to show that a discriminatory animus was at
least "a motivating factor" in the defendant's decision, and reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment.59
4. Sexual Harassment.
In Furcron v. Mail Centers Plus, LLC, 60 the manner in which the
plaintiff complained of sexual harassment ended up getting her fired.
The plaintiff was employed as a mail room clerk for a company which
provided administrative support activities for the Coca-Cola Company.
A coworker, Daniel Seligman, was transferred to the plaintiffs work area
in the mail room, where they worked together for a period of six days.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Calvert, 648 F. App'x at 929.
Id.
641 F. App'x 883 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 884, 887.
Id. at 887.
Id. at 891.
Id.
Id. at 892.
843 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2016).
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Seligman suffered from Asperger's Syndrome, which resulted in his frequently making awkward and inappropriate mannerisms in the workplace, "including, staring, brushing up against employees, and talking in
people's faces." 6 ' The plaintiff initially tried to be friendly to Seligman,
but she believed he mistook her behavior for flirtation. She complained
that he frequently tried to stare at her breasts and buttocks when she
bent over. She also noticed that he frequently had an erect penis while
they worked together. She took a photograph of Seligman "from the neck
down," so that she would have proof that Seligman "exhibited an erection
in the workplace." 62 However, in addition to showing the photograph to
management, the plaintiff also showed it to several coworkers, which violated company policy. Following an investigation, the plaintiff was terminated for "[taking sexually suggestive pictures of a male associate's
private are[a] without his permission or knowledge." 63 The plaintiff
brought suit under Title VII for sexual harassment and retaliation. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendant. 64
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the district court had
properly dismissed the plaintiffs retaliation claim.6 5 However, with respect to the sexual harassment claim, the court of appeals focused on the
district court's exclusion of the affidavit of another female coworker, who
alleged that Seligman had also looked at her in a sexual manner, and
"would look at [her] breasts and [her] rear when [she] bent over."6 6 The
district court had excluded the affidavit as 'largely immaterial."6 7 Determining that this type of "me too" evidence was admissible under Rule
404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence 68 to prove intent to discriminate,
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the district court had abused its discretion in excluding the affidavit,69 and remanded the case for further proceedings. 70

61. Id. at 1300.
62. Id. at 1301.
63. Id. at 1302.

64. Id. at 1303.
65. Id. at 1307.

66. Id. at 1308.
67. Id. at 1309.
68. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
69. Furcron, 843 F.3d at 1309.
70. Id. at 1315.
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C. Hostile Work Environment
Stancombe v. New Process Steel LP, 7 1 is another example of how difficult it is to establish a hostile work environment claim. The plaintiff was
hired for a temporary position at a steel processing company. He resigned after working only one month following two incidents of alleged
sexual harassment by a male coworker. The first incident involved the
coworker hugging the plaintiff and touching his buttocks three times
while stating, "good job, good job."72 The plaintiff complained about this
incident, which resulted in an immediate investigation. Pending the investigation, the plaintiff was transferred to a different location, and the
coworker was directed not to have any contact with the plaintiff. Two
days later, both the plaintiff and the coworker volunteered to work overtime over a weekend. At some point during this time, the coworker came
over to the plaintiffs work area while the plaintiff was alone and kneeling down, grabbed the plaintiffs head, and "made three pelvic thrusts in
his face." 73 This incident lasted only "three to four seconds." 74 In re75
sponse, the plaintiff "angrily picked up his tools, clocked out, and left."

During the company's subsequent investigation, the coworker denied
that this second incident took place, and there were no other witnesses.
However, the coworker was suspended for three days for his admitted
conduct in the first incident. The plaintiff filed an action pursuant to
Title VII alleging a hostile work environment based on sex.7 6 The district
court granted summary judgment for the employer.77
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court.78 Although the court of appeals agreed that the coworker's conduct was "inappropriate and vulgar,"79 the court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the conduct was "discrimination because of sex"
or that it was sufficient to "alter the 'conditions' of the victim's employment."80 The court also noted that there was no basis on which to hold

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

652 F. App'x 729 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 731.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 731-32.
Id.
Id. at 741.
Id. at 734.
Id.
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the employer liable since the company had taken "immediate and appropriate correction action."8 1 Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed. 82
D. Employer Defenses
1. Statute of Limitations.
In Green v. Brennan,83 the issue before the Supreme Court of the
United States was when the statute of limitations begins ticking in the
context of a constructive discharge claim. The plaintiff, an African-American, had worked for the United States Postal Service in Colorado for
thirty-five years. After he was denied a promotion to a vacant postmaster
position, he complained that he was denied the promotion because of his
race. Following his complaint, the plaintiffs relationship with his supervisors "crumbled." 84 Thereafter, two of the plaintiffs supervisors accused
him of intentionally delaying the mail, which was a criminal offense. Following an investigation, the plaintiff signed an agreement in which he
agreed to retire and resign in exchange for the Postal Service to not pursue criminal charges. Following his resignation, the plaintiff filed a complaint of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)
counselor. This complaint was filed forty-one days after he submitted his
resignation, but ninety-six days after he had signed the settlement agreement. In the plaintiffs subsequent lawsuit pursuant to Title VII alleging
race discrimination, the district court granted summary judgment to the
Postal Service, holding that the plaintiff had not filed his complaint with
the EEO counselor within the required forty-five days.8 5 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed this decision.86
The Supreme Court resolved a split in the circuits on this issue.87
Three circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, held that the limitations period for constructive discharge claims began after the "employer's last
discriminatory act."88 The Supreme Court disagreed with these deci-

81. Id. at 736.
82. Id. at 741.
83. 136 S. Ct. 1769 (2016).
84. Id. at 1774.
85. Id. at 1775.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see Mayers v. Laborers' Health & Safety Fund of N. Am., 478 F.3d 364 (D.C.
Cir. 2007); Davidson v. Ind.-Am. Water Works, 953 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1992); cf. Flaherty
v. Metromail Corp., 235 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000); Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d
1104 (9th Cir. 1998); Hukkanen v. Operating Eng'rs, 3 F.3d 281 (8th Cir. 1993); and Young
v. Nat'l Ctr. for Health Servs. Research, 828 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1987).
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sions, however, and held that the limitations period begins for constructive discharge claims "only after an employee resigns." 89 The Court then
remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit to determine when the plaintiffs
notice of resignation "in fact" occurred.9 0
2. Judicial Estoppel.
In Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., 91 it is not the initial panel majority opinion which is of note, but rather, the lengthy concurring opinion of Senior
Appellate Judge Gerald Tjoflat. The initial panel majority opinion was
simply another example of what is now a fairly long line of Eleventh Circuit precedent determining that a plaintiff in an employment discrimination action is judicially estopped from bringing his or her employment
discrimination claim, where the employee has failed to disclose the claim
in a concurrent bankruptcy proceeding. 92 The plaintiff brought a Title
VII action alleging race discrimination. A number of months after bringing her discrimination claim, the plaintiff filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition. However, she failed to disclose her pending discrimination
claim in her bankruptcy proceedings, where she was required to disclose
under oath whether she had been 'a party' to any 'suits and administrative proceedings."' 93 The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendant, ruling that prior Eleventh Circuit precedent controlled its
decision. 94 On appeal, relying upon its prior decision in Burnes v. Pemco
Aeroplex, Inc.95 and its progeny, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.96
However, in a lengthy concurring opinion, Judge Tjoflat expressed his
sharp disagreement with the result in the case. Judge Tjoflat initially
noted that he concurred in the court's judgment because the result was
dictated by binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.97 The concurring opinion
then went on to state that the "doctrine of judicial estoppel" as decided in
the Burnes decision (and others) was "wrongly decided."98 The concurring opinion concluded: "The consequences of today's decision make the

89. Green, 136 S. Ct. at 1776.
90. Id. at 1782.
91. 820 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2016), rehearingen banc grantedand opinion vacated, No.
12-15548, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16090 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2016).
92. See, e.g., Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2010); Burnes v.
Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002).
93. Slater, 820 F.3d at 1196.
94. Id. at 1198.
95. 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002).
96. Slater, 820 F.3d at 1210.
97. Id. (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
98. Id.
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problem clear: [the defendant] is granted a windfall, [the plaintiffs] creditors are deprived of an asset and the Bankruptcy Court is stripped of its
discretion."99 The concurring opinion then went on for many pages to
explain why the court's prior decisions were wrong. Apparently, the concurring opinion attracted the attention of the remainder of the court. On
August 30, 2016, rehearing en banc was granted, and the panel opinion
was vacated. 100 Perhaps the 2018 Survey Article will reveal whether the
full court sticks to its guns on its judicial estoppel precedent, or whether
it decides, as the concurring opinion suggests, that those cases were
"wrongly decided."10 1
E. Remedies
1. Consent Decrees.
Coffey v. Braddy102 hopefully will mark the end of a thirty-four year
old dispute in the City of Jacksonville, Florida Fire Department. In 1982,
the district court entered a consent decree requiring Jacksonville's fire
department to hire an equal number of black and white firefighters, until
the ratio of "black fire fighters to white fire fighters reflect[ed] the ratio
of black citizens to white citizens in the City of Jacksonville." 103 In 1992,
after complying with the decree for ten years, the City of Jacksonville
unilaterally stopped following the decree. The plaintiffs took no action
for fifteen years, but in 2007, the plaintiffs, dissatisfied with the racial
makeup of the Jacksonville fire department, filed a motion to show cause
as to why the city should not be held in contempt for violating the 1982
decree. The district court denied the motion on the ground of laches, and
dissolved the 1982 decree. 104 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that
the plaintiffs' fifteen-year delay "prejudiced the City's ability to defend
itself"10 5 and found that the district court's application of the doctrine of
laches and dissolution of the 1982 decree was not an abuse of discretion. 106

99. Id.
100.

Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 12-15548, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16090 (11th Cir.

Aug. 30, 2016).
101. Slater, 820 F.3d at 1210.
102. 834 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2016).
103. Id. at 1186.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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2. Attorney Fees.
CRST Vann Expedited, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,10 7 represents a huge victory for defendants' attorney fees under
Title VII. The defendant is a trucking company that employed a team
driving system in which two employees were assigned to share driving
duties with each truck. The EEOC brought suit on behalf of one of the
defendant's female drivers and all other "similarly situated" female employees, alleging sexual harassment and a sexual hostile working environment. 108 Although the EEOC purported to represent 250 female employees, nearly one hundred of the claims were dismissed as a discovery
sanction (when the EEOC failed to produce the women for deposition),
and the claims of all but sixty-seven female employees were found to be
barred on a variety of grounds. With respect to the final sixty-seven female employees, the district court ruled that these claims were all barred
because the EEOC had not fulfilled its statutory obligation to investigate
and conciliate these claims. Accordingly, the district court dismissed the
action and held that the defendant was a prevailing party. 109 In response
to the defendant's ensuing motion for an award of attorney fees, the district court ruled that the EEOC's failure to fulfill its presuit obligations
was "unreasonable," and awarded the defendant $4 million in attorney
fees.110 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, relying on its own precedent,"1 the court of appeals reversed the
award of attorney fees, ruling that the district court's dismissal of the
remaining sixty-seven claims was not a "judicial determination on the
merits," which the court found was a prerequisite to a defendant's award
of fees.112
Before the Supreme Court, however, the Court, relying largely on its
notion of "common sense," reversed the Eighth Circuit.11 3 The Court held
that a Title VII defendant "need not obtain a favorable judgment on the
merits in order to be a 'prevailing party."' 114 The Court went on to explain
that although a defendant "might prefer a judgment vindicating its position regarding the substantive merits of the plaintiffs allegations," 1 5 the

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
1994).
112.
113.
114.
115.

136 S. Ct. 1642 (2016).
Id. at 1647-48.
Id. at 1648-49.
Id.
See Marquart v. Lodge 837, Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 26 F.3d 842 (8th Cir.
CRST, 136 S. Ct. at 1650.
Id. at 1651.
Id.
Id.
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defendant was considered a prevailing party under the statute "whenever the plaintiffs challenge is rebuffed, irrespective of the precise reason
for the court's decision."11 6 The defendant now has four million reasons
to celebrate its procedural, non-merits victory!
II. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

Two noteworthy Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA) 117 cases were decided by the Eleventh Circuit during the survey
period. One decision will probably be reviewed by the Supreme Court of
the United States. The other concerned an issue of potentially narrow
application, the issue of tribal sovereign immunity.
A. Coverage under the Act
In Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,11s in an en banc opinion,
the court of appeals decided that job applicants may not maintain claims
under the ADEA based upon a disparate impact theory of liability." 9 Circuit Judge William Pryor wrote the majority opinion. Several judges filed
concurring and dissenting opinions.1 20 According to Judge Pryor, "[t]he
main issue presented by this appeal is whether the [ADEA] allows an
unsuccessful job applicant to sue an employer for using a practice that
has a disparate impact on older workers."'21 A majority of the circuit
judges concluded that Section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA1 22 protects an individual only if he has a "status as an employee."1 23 The dissents took issue
with Judge Pryor's statutory interpretation and would have allowed a
more expansive reading of Section 4(a)(2), thereby permitting applicants
to maintain disparate impact claims under the ADEA.124 Judge Pryor
noted that job applicants are not without recourse, notwithstanding the
majority's narrow reading of Section 4(a)(2).1 25 Judge Pryor maintains

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
ring in
J. join,
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012).
839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4193 (June 26, 2017).
Id. at 961.
Id. (Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Rosenbaum, J., concurpart and dissenting in part; Martin, J., dissenting in which Wilson, J. and Pryor,
and in which Jordan, J. and Rosenbaum, J. join as to Part II).
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 4(a)(2) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2)).
Villarreal,839 F.3d at 961.
Id. at 973.
Id. at 970.
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that applicants may still bring claims of disparate treatment under Section 4(a)(1) of the ADEA,126 notwithstanding the narrow reading. 127 Villarreal sought certiorari review from the Supreme Court of the United
States. 128 On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court denied Villarreal's petition. 129
B. Tribal Immunity
In the other ADEA appeal reported during the survey period, Williams
v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians,130 a panel concluded that even though
Indian tribes are not specifically included in the list of entities included
in the definition of the term "employer" adopted by Congress for ADEA
coverage purposes, Congress did not intend to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity when enacting the ADEA. Consequently, ADEA suits against
tribes are barred.
In Williams, a long-term employee of the Poarch Band of Creek Indians tribe asserted that her employment had been unlawfully terminated
due to her age and that she had been replaced by a younger, inexperienced individual. The Poarch Band moved to dismiss the suit, arguing
that the federal courts are without subject matter jurisdiction over such
claims due to the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. 131 The district
court dismissed the action on that ground and this appeal followed.132
The court of appeals concluded that the district court had correctly decided the question. 133
After extensively reviewing the interesting history of the Poarch Band
of Creek Indians, 134 the panel concluded that the Poarch Band had never
waived its immunity and consequently retained its common law exemption from suits generally. 135 The court next concluded that Congress had
not abrogated the doctrine of tribal immunity for age discrimination

126. Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 4(a)(1), 81 Stat. 602, 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
623(a)(1)).
127. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 970.
128. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied,
2017 US LEXIS 4193 (June 26, 2017).
129. 2017 US LEXIS 4193 (June 26, 2017).
130. 839 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2016).
131. Id. at 1314.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1315-16.
135. Id. at 1317-18.
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claims when enacting the ADEA in 1967.136 Aligning the Eleventh Circuit with the United States Courts of Appeal for the Second, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits, 13 7 the panel reasoned that the greater weight of authority
supported the right of the Poarch Band to tribal sovereign immunity from
claims based on the ADEA. 138
III. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990

A. Qualified Individuals
Valdes v. City of Dorall39 presented an Eleventh Circuit panel with the
question of whether or not a police officer who was unable to respond to
emergencies due to his disability is a qualified individual with a disability. Affirming the ruling of the district court that the police officer was
no longer qualified, the panel concluded that because the police officer's
panic disorder prevented him from responding to emergency calls for service, he was not qualified to occupy the position of employment as a police
officer.140

The panel observed that in order to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
141 a plaintiff must show "he had a disability, he was a qualified individual, and he was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of his disability." 142 To be "qualified" for purposes of the ADA, an individual must
be able to perform the "essential functions" of his job with or without reasonable accommodation. 143 It was undisputed that the plaintiff was limited to only performing office work because of his panic disorder. The
plaintiffs doctor testified that he could not drive a police car, patrol the
street, make arrests, testify in court, manage a law enforcement situation, or do anything that required leaving the office. 144 Concluding that
the city had made clear that the ability to work outside the office was

136. Id. at 1318-24.
137. Garcia v. Akwesasne Hous. Auth., 268 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 2001); EEOC v. Fond du
Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246, 250-51 (8th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Cherokee
Nation, 871 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1989). See also Longo v. Seminole Indian CasinoImmokalee, 813 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2016).
138. Williams, 839 F.3d at 1325.
139. 662 F. App'x 803 (11th Cir. 2016).
140. Id. at 810.
141. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
142. Valdes, 662 F. App'x at 808.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 808-09.
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essential to the lieutenant job the plaintiff occupied even though he
might not be frequently called upon to demonstrate that ability:
In that sense, a lieutenant is like a lifeguard, who must have the ability to rescue a swimmer in distress although he might not spend much
time actually engaged in that essential activity. Given the substantial
evidence favoring the City, there is no basis for a reasonable jury to
[conclude] that Plaintiff could perform the essential function of work145
ing outside the office.
Consequently, the panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the City of Doral. 146
B. Reasonable Accommodation
Two published decisions during the survey period should help practitioners define the scope of an employer's obligation to accommodate individuals with disabilities. Accommodation cases are frequently litigated.
First, in Frazier-White v. Gee,147 the plaintiff appealed a district court's
order granting summary judgment to the defendant. In the run-up to the
litigation, after suffering a work-related injury, the plaintiff sought an
indefinite light duty assignment as an accommodation. Her employer
determined that her request was unreasonable and eventually discharged her from employment after she had exhausted all available
leaves. In the suit that ensued, the district court granted summary judgment to the employer, concluding that indefinite light duty status was
48
The panel
not a reasonable accommodation request under the ADA.1
149
affirmed.
unanimously
In EEOC v. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., 150 the panel concluded that the
district court had correctly ruled on the hospital's motion for summary
judgment, when it determined that the hospital did not have the obligation to unilaterally reassign the plaintiff to a vacant position without requiring that she compete with other applicants for the position. 151

145.
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147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 810.
Id. at 813.
818 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1255-56.
Id. at 1258.
842 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1345-47.
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IV. THE CIViL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
A. Section 1981
In Moore v. Grady Memorial Hospital Corp., 152 the court concluded a
hospital's suspension of the surgical privileges of a medical school assistant professor stated a cognizable Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866153 claim for interference with his existing contract rights with the
medical school. The African-American medical doctor and medical school
assistant professor appealed the dismissal of his § 1981 claims of race
discrimination and retaliation against the hospital and certain medical
doctors and staff members at the hospital.1 54 The plaintiff had argued
below that because his hospital privileges had been suspended, he lost
his job as an assistant professor at the medical school.
The plaintiff "is a licensed, board-certified general surgeon and a specialist in laparoscopic and advanced robotic surgery."155 As a condition
of his employment on the faculty of the Morehouse School of Medicine,
the plaintiff was required to obtain clinical privileges at Grady Memorial
Hospital in Atlanta. Grady Memorial initially granted the plaintiff privileges, and he subsequently entered into an employment agreement with
Morehouse as an assistant professor in the department of surgery.156
Sometime later, concerns arose at Grady Memorial concerning certain
surgical procedures that the plaintiff performed. As a result, his privileges at Grady were subsequently suspended, and acrimony ensued.15 7
Ultimately, the plaintiff sued Grady Memorial and several of the physicians at Grady Memorial alleging various causes of action, including the
§ 1981 claims at issue on appeal.15 8 The district court granted a motion
to dismiss the federal claims and the doctor subsequently appealed.159
The principal § 1981 issue presented on appeal was whether the doctor
could sufficiently identify and plead the existence of contractual relationship under which he had rights that were impaired as a result of the
actions of the defendants.16 0 Deciding that the district court had incorrectly relied on an earlier unpublished opinion to conclude that the doctor

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

834 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016).
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012).
Moore, 834 F.3d at 1169, 1171-72.
Id. at 1169.
Id.
Id. at 1170.
Id. at 1171.
Id.
Id. at 1172.
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did not, the panel reversed.16 1 The court of appeals concluded that a
claim based on the suspension of medical privileges was a discriminatory
act that interfered with the doctor's contract with the Morehouse School
of Medicine. Consequently, at least for preliminary pleading purposes,
an actionable cause of action had been stated. That portion of the decision of the district court was reversed and the cause was remanded for
62
further proceedings.1
B. Section 1983
Several potentially significant Section 1983163 decisions were rendered
during the survey period, including one decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States.
1. Political Affiliation.
Heffernan v. City of Paterson 64 provided the Supreme Court of the
United States with the opportunity to clarify what impact, if any, critical
factual mistakes made by defendants may have on § 1983 causes of action. Heffernan was a police officer with the City of Paterson, New Jersey. 65 City officials mistakenly believed that Heffernan had been actively involved in a mayoral campaign. In fact, he was not involved in
any capacity in the campaign. Fellow police officers had observed Heffernan holding a campaign sign while speaking with individuals who
were involved in the campaign. From this observation, his supervisors
incorrectly concluded that he was involved and demoted him because of
6
his "overt involvement" in the campaign.16 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that Heffernan's attempted §
1983 claim was only actionable if his employer's actions had been
prompted by his actual, rather than his perceived, exercise of free speech
68
In a seven to
rights.1 67 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
are enemployees
that
concluded
court
two decision, the majority of the
governif
the
even
actions
Amendment
titled to challenge unlawful First
69
ment makes a factual mistake about the employee's behavior.1

161. Id. at 1173 (referring to Williams v. Columbus Reg'1 Healthcare Sys., Inc., 499 F.
App'x 928 (11th Cir. 2012)).
162. Id. at 1176.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
164. 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016).
165. Id. at 1416.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1419.
169. Id.
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2. Alabama State Bar is Arm of the State.
In Nicholas v. Alabama State Bar,170 the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the Alabama State Bar is an arm of the State of Alabama and therefore is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from civil rights suits
for the alleged deprivation of due process rights by members of the bar
association. 171
3. Sheriff as Chief Corrections Officer is not Arm of the State
of Florida.
In Stanley v. Broward County Sheriff,1 72 a former deputy sheriff
brought an action against a Florida sheriff in his capacity as the chief
correctional officer for Broward County after he was not rehired as a deputy sheriff because of his support of a political adversary of the sheriff.
As a matter of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Florida sheriffs do not act as an arm of the State of Florida when they serve
in the capacity of chief correctional officer for a Florida county. 173
4. Public Speech.
Continuing the evolution of public speech law following the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in Garcetti v. Cebollos,174 a panel
of the court of appeals determined in Carollo v. Boria,175 that a discharged city manager was speaking as a citizen and not pursuant to his
job duties when he made reports to law enforcement and other agencies
about alleged campaign law violations by city officials and therefore was
entitled to First Amendment protection. The decision is worth reading
because the panel takes the opportunity to "clarify the First Amendment
rights of public employees." 78 What follows is a succinct discussion of
the current state of First Amendment law in the Eleventh Circuit. 177
5. "Be On the Look Out" For First Amendment Rights.
Bailey v. Wheeler178 was the appeal of a police officer who had lost his
job after reporting racial profiling and other potential violations of law
by his fellow officers. In an ill-advised action they probably thought was
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173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

815 F.3d 726 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 733.
843 F.3d 920 (11th Cir. 2016).
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funny at the time, certain officers with the Douglas County, Georgia
Sheriffs Department issued a "BOLO Advisory" to all law enforcement
in the County following Bailey's firing, describing plaintiff as a "loose
cannon", and an individual who constituted a danger to Douglas County
law enforcement officers.1 7 9 Bailey had filed a written complaint with his
chief of police, reporting that other Douglasville officers and Douglas
County Sheriffs deputies had been racially profiling minority citizens
and committing other constitutional violations. 180 Several months later,
after Bailey found himself without a job, he claimed in his suit that his
firing was the result of his written complaint. He appealed his termination, again reporting constitutional violations during his unsuccessful administrative appeal. 181 The day following his appeal hearing, he alleged
that a high-ranking officer with the Douglas County Sheriffs Office issued a countywide alert, known in law enforcement circles as a "BOLO,"
to all law enforcement officers. 182 The alert included Bailey's picture and
loose cannon'. . .[who
warned law enforcement officers that he was a .'

was] a danger to any [law-enforcement officer] in Douglas County," and
directed that all officers "act accordingly." 183 When he learned of the
"BOLO," Bailey sued, alleging that its issuance violated his First Amendment rights. The defendants moved to dismiss the claim alleging they
were entitled to qualified immunity from liability for their actions. The
184
district court denied the motion and the defendants then appealed.
A panel affirmed the district court's ruling, determining that Bailey
185
had sufficiently alleged a First Amendment violation under those facts.
The panel concluded, that for qualified immunity purposes, Bailey's constitutional right to be free from retaliation that imperiled his life was
clearly established.18 6
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